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The Flow of Investment and the Pattern of
Rates of Return
THE assets and rates of return of manufacturing industries have hitherto
been available only for selected years or selected companies.It is oniy
because of the statistical by-products of the collection of a corporate
income tax that we now possess annual estimates of the stock of capital,
and the rates of return thereon, for numerous manufacturing industries
(rising from 96 in 1938 to 109 in later years of our study), for a period of
twenty years. We begin by surveying the broad trends of the behavior of
investment and returns.It is usually convenient for statistical as well as
economic reasons to treat the period dominated by World War II (1938
to 1947) separately from the later period.'
We shall be compelled to deal chiefly with the dollar volume of assets
and rates of return as they are reported in the balance sheets and income
statements of businesses. It would be disingenuous to evade acknowledge-
ment that our inability to adjust these data for price changes is a very
serious limitation on their usefulness. In the final section of this chapter
we examine so far as possible the relationship between assets and rates of
return in book values and the corresponding quantities in stable (1947)
prices. The correspondence appears to be sufficiently good for the broad
industry categories, so that the larger differences (especially among
industries at a given time) probably reflect differences in "real" capital
and even more in rates of return.
Before we turn to the behavior of investment and rates of return—the two
main subjects of this chapter—over the period of our study, it may be well
to glance at a somewhat longer time span for which data for all manu-
facturing industries can be roughly pieced together.2 The stock of capital
in manufacturing and the rates of return after taxes are presented in
Chart 1; the data are reported in book values.
The war and postwar years which constitute our special period form a
striking contrast to the decade which preceded it. The stock of capital in
manufacturing corporations had reached $64 billion in 1929; thereafter,
it fell by almost $20 billion in the next six years and did not regain the
The main statistical reason for the division is that extensive changes in industry
classification were made in 1948—and, we may add, 1958.
Before 1938 there was much less detail compiled or published on the manufacturing
industries. The basic data for 1926 to 1938 underlying Chart 1 are described in Appendix
B.
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a Data for 1926 to 1933 are not strictly comparable to those for the later period.
See Appendix B.
Source: The data on which the chart is based are to be found in Table B-I.AND THE PATTERN OF RATES OF RETURN
1929 level until 1941. A continuous and often spectacular growth began
with the outbreak of World War II, interrupted only once by a moderate
decline in 1945.It is doubtful that so sustained a rise in book values
(reflecting, of course, price rises as well as real investment) had previously
occurred in this country.
The contrast in the behavior of the rates of return in the two periods
was less marked. In the late 1920's the rate averaged about 6.7 per cent.
It fell to —2.5 per cent in 1932 and then began a rise which brought it
back nearly to the level of the late twenties. The great contrast is between
the 1930's when the rate never exceeded 6.2 per cent and the 1940's when
it fell below this level in only one year (1945). The trend was steadily
downward in the 1950's. Our period was characterized by persistent
expansion (and inflation) and the absence of widespread business losses,
which exclude a range of problems—such as "sick" industries and the
mobility of capital in severe depression—which a longer time span would
have presented.
1. The Flow of Investment
The aggregate assets in manufacturing rose by $161.0 billion, or slightly
more than 325 per cent, between 1938 and 1957 (Table 3).3 A consider-
able part of this immense increase took place in two great waves of
investment: the first dominated by World War II, when $39.5 billion
was added in five years; the second and more sustained wave running
from 1945 to the end of our period, when, another $123.4 billion was
added.
If we turn to assets measured in 1947 prices, however, the picture
changes radically. The total increase in capital is reduced to $81.8
billion, and the average annual rate of growth for the eighteen years falls
from 8.0 to 3.3 per cent. The almost unbroken record of growth of capital
in book values—only a 4.5 per cent fall in 1945 breaks the record—
becomes wholly transformed:total capital reached a peak in 1943,
declined by a tenth in 1946, and it was not until sometime in 1950 that
the 1943 level was again reached.
The finding that aggregate capital did not surpass the 1943 peak until
1950 is in substantial disagreement with the Department of Commerce
estimates.These estimates (which exclude working capital other than
Unless otherwise qualified, "assets" or "capital" excludes investments in other
companies, includes noncorporate business, and is reported in book values.Balance
sheets for a given year usually refer to December 31 of that year, but a portion of corpora-
tions report on fiscal years falling within sis months on either side; see W. L. Crum,
Fiscal- rear Reporting for Corporate Income Tax, Technical Paper 11, New York, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1956.
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TABLE 3
















1938 48,846 94,189 — — — —
1939 50,955 96,195 57 2,491 25 615
1940 55,049 101,817 70 2,690 12 207
1941 65,892 113,466 78 8,238 4 42
1942 80,303 128,549 62 9,298 20 623
1943 89,675 135,282 58 4,913 24 587
1944 90,511 132,623 63 3,333 19 527
1945 86,445 122,714 48 1,791 34 2,381
1946 93,156 122,186 78 11,048 4 661
1947 106,339 125,911 76 11,982 6 143
l947c 106,580 126,498 — — — —
1948 116,160 131,118 81 10,237 18 508
1949 118,088 132,060 45 3,625 54 1,710
1950 135,142 142,056 95 16,800 4 141
1951 153,948 151,878 90 18,764 9 226
1952 162,853 157,327 — — — —
1953 169,695 160,345 69 11,009" 30 1,369"
1954 173,111 161,229 57 7,005 42 2,787
1955 190,670171,445 88 18,075 11 496
1956 203,107 175,710 70 13,714 29 1,380
1957 209,892 175,999 65 9,595 34 2,356
a Basedupon 2-digit industrial categories.
b Based upon 3-digit industries;restricted to "basic" set of industries, described on
p. 111.
On 1948 industiial classification.
d For two-year period, 1951—53.
SOURCE: Tables A-14 to A-59.
inventories) suggest that a wartime peak (reached in 1942) was consider-
ably exceeded by l946. So far as fixed assets are concerned, a major
source of difference is that we accept, and the Commerce study implicitly
rejects, the accelerated depreciation allowances permitted on facilities
constructed during the war.Some comments on this question are
offered in Appendix A; suffice it to say that some of the accelerated
depreciation undoubtedly represented a correct recognition of the fact
that plants constructed to produce munitions had a much reduced peace-
time usefulness.5 The true amount of depreciation that should have been
DonaldG. Wooden and Robert C.Wasson, "Manufacturing Investment since 1929,"
Surveyof Cur, ent Business, Nov. 1956, p. 14.
We also have higherdeflated figures for durable capital inthe earlier period because
of the use of a different set of deflators. Possibly, Commerce's method of finding capital
by accumulating previous investment (which requires knowledge of the share of invest-
ment goods purchased by manufacturing industries) is less reliable in the early years.
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charged against the defense facilities cannot be known, and one is left
with the ambiguous conclusion that itlies somewhere between the
accelerated and the normal rates of depreciation.
If we cannot judge conclusively the popular view that the war left the
American economy with a rich legacy of modern capital equipment
suitable to ordinary peacetime purposes, we can at least shed some doubt
on it.For our capital stock grew at the rate of about 5 per cent annually
from 1939 to 1944 if most accelerated depreciation properly represented
small postwar usefulness. This is not an especially large rate of growth
from a depression to a period of high prosperity and, indeed, from 1946
to 1953 the annual rate was 3.9 per cent.It is often—and erroneously—
said that, if a warring nation borrows (domestically), it is shifting the
burden to future generations; we can at least suggest that World War II
offers no support for the view that waging war confers an economic boon
on these generations.
The capital movements from 1938 to 1946 were dominated by the
mobilization and demobilization of the American economy. Most of the
industries that make finished munitions were too small to be reported
separately before 1942, but those that were segregated doubled their
capital in 1940, again in 1941, and in 1942 quadrupled their capital. In
1939, assets in these industries were $0.6 billion; in 1943 they amounted
to $13.4 billion, or one-seventh of all manufacturing capital. The sub-
sequent decline was even more abrupt: within three years the capital of
the munitions industries (by then chiefly aircraft and ships) had fallen to
$2.4 billion.
Those vast movements of capital into and out of munitions did not
occasion comparable movements of capital in the industries supplying
material and equipment (see Table 4).In large part, the mobilization
consisted simply of redirection of the output of producer goods industries—
steel went into tanks instead of into automobiles.
Even in the capital reported in the munitions industries, however, we
find a large amount of the capital which in earlier years was reported by
other industries. The larger automobile companies disappeared from the
automobile industry during the war,° because their major receipts then
came from aircraft and tanks. The shift of an entire company to a new
industry, when its sales may have shifted moderately in composition
The number of companies making motor vehicles (including trucks and industrial
trailers) with assets over $100 million varied as follows:
19423 1944 1 19460
19430 1945 1 19475
19489
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TABLE 4
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF CAPITAL IN MUNITIONS










1938—39 35.0 6.8 6.4 2.6
1939—40 96.3 20.9 7.4 6.5
1940—41 115.8 34.0 19.6 15.9
1941—42 355.8 39.2 9.5 7.2
1942—43 103.7 20.7 3.5 4.1
1943—44 —14.3 —1.3 —0.5 5.8
1944—45 —24.9 —12.3 —2.1 3.4
1945—46 —77.6 7.2 12.1 33.9
1940—47 —24.6 15.7 22.0 13.1
a Ships,aircraft, firearms, ammunition, tanks, sighting and firing equipment, and
munitions n.e.c.
1) Industrial chemicals, blast furnaces, structural steel, miscellaneous iron and steel,
basic nonferrous metals, miscellaneous nonferrous metals, communications, engines and
turbines, general industrial machinery, metalworking machinery.
SOURCE: Tables A-14 to A-35.
(although of course the shift was complete for automobiles), is an undesir-
able statistical source of instability in the capital data, discussed below.
The opposite side of this picture was the much slower rate of growth of
capital in the consumer goods industries. But even here there was no re-
duction of capital, even if capital is measured in 1947 prices: only two
industries (furniture and motor vehicles) declined from 1940 to 1945; and
the group of industries as a whole showed an increase of 12.6 per cent.
Two main developments dominated the growth of capital from 1947 to
1956. The first was the immense program of construction of housing,
plant, and equipment. Between those dates the total assets in manu-
facturing rose 90.8 per cent, but the construction goods industries much
surpassed that growth (Table 5)—indeed, of the larger industries only
structural clay failed to exceed the rate of increase of all manufacturing.
The expansion of construction was paralleled by a large increase in
agricultural supplies (agricultural machinery and fertilizers).
The second development was the retardation of investment in the
consumer goods industries. None of the four beverage industries, nor eight
food industries (all except cereals), nor the two tobacco industries, nor the
thirteen textile and apparel industries, nor footwear, had so large a rate
of increase of assets as all manufacturing. The only large consumer goods
industry whose capital grew rapidly was motor vehicles (and with it,
petroleum refining), and of course it started from a somewhat fictitious
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TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF CAPITAL IN CONSTRUCTION
GOODS INDUSTRIES, BooK VALUES, 1947—56
Percentage Increase
Industry (total manufacturing =90.8)
Concrete products 188.1











SOURCE: Tables A-36 to A-59.
1947base.The shiftof consumers' expenditures toward services
presumably was one cause of the slow growth of capital.7
THE DISPERSION OF RELATIVE RATES OF INVESTMENT
The great differences in the rates of increase of capital in munitions and
nonmunitions industries has already been noted (Table 5); similar though
smaller dispersion is common even among nonmunitions industries, and
in peacetime. But before this characteristic is looked at more closely,
some cautions with respect to the data are in order.
The annual rates of increase of capital are unfortunately much in-
fluenced by deficiencies of data. The reclassification of a single large
firm—even among our fairly broad industries—can lead to a fictitiously
large increase in one industry and a fictitiously small increase in another.
Beginning with 1942 (when the asset-size classes were first given in tha
Source Book), the behavior of large firms was examined in those industries
where an annual rate of change of assets fell outside two standard devia-
tions of the rates of increase for that year. When shifting of large firms
appeared to be the source of the large rate of change, it was sometimes
possible to adjust the data, and in others at least to detect the incompara-
bilities. But the reclassification of large firms cannot always be detected
Too small a share of service enterprises is incorporated to place much confidence in
the asset figures for this category, but it is worth noting that assets of corporations in
retail trade and services rose by only 94 per cent over the 1947—56 period—slightly more
than the figure for all manufacturing.
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and that of smaller firms is even more elusive, accounting for a portion of
the observed dispersion. Where the reclassification of firms was detected
but adjustments were not feasible, the industry was excluded from the
"basic" set of industries, described on p. 111.
In only five years of the entire period was the average rate of increase of
assets as large as the standard deviation of the rates (Table 6), despite the
TABLE 6













1938—39 82 3.72 9.42 —1.73 7.92
1939—40 82 7.93 10.37 1.77 13.39
1940—41 82 17.38 12.81 8.27 25.36
1941—42 82 11.10 14.53 1.94 20.75
1942—43 82 5.85 10.79 —1.25 11.94
1943—44 82 4.63 7.53 0.09 9.83
1944-45 82 2.01 9.58 —3.21 7.36
1945—46 82 19.94 16.27 10.58 27.19
1946—47 82 15.06 10.43 8.83 20.28
1947—48 99 7.60 8.44 2.42 12.85













1951_53a 99 3.06 6.19 —1.14 6.74
1953—54 99 1.34 7.78 —3.45 5.10
1954—55 99 9.77 8.30 4.67 15.00
1955—56 99 3.86 8.05 —1.11 9.00
1956_57b 99 1.89 8.62 —2.19 6.80
aAnnual rate for two-year period.
For percentage increase in corporate assets only.
SOURCE: Tables A-14 to A-59.
fact that ordnance industries and other industries with obvious incom-
parabilities were excluded.In five years, more than a fourth of the
industries increased their assets by 20 per cent or more and, despite the
almost continuous rise of price levels, in eight of the nineteen years more
than one-fourth of the industries had decreases of assets. Rather systema-
tically, the dispersion of rates is larger, the larger the average rate of
increase, but the dispersion of rates varies less than the average rate, so the
dispersion of rates is smaller relative to the average rate in years of large
investment. The distributions of rates of increase are presented in the
various panels of Chart 2.
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One might conjecture that the largest and smallest rates of increase are
found in the smallest industries, where smaller absolute increments or
decrements of investment will suffice for large relative movements of
capital.8There isscarcely any relationship, however, between the
standard deviations of the rates of increase of capital of individual indus-
tries from 1947 to 1954 and the size of the industry (measured by 1950
assets) .
Themobility of capital among industries can be defined in such a way
that it is measured by the dispersion of rates of increase of capital. Mobility
must be measured from a base representing immobility, and one base
would be provided by the assumption that the assets of all industries grow
at the same rate: then capital could be considered to be moving from
slowly growing to rapidly growing industries. An industry's actual rate
of increase minus the average (weighted) rate of increase would be a
measure of absolute mobility in this particular sense.
On this interpretation, the dispersion of rates of increase of assets
measures also mobility, and the interpretation is in keeping with expecta-
tions. The greatest single year of mobility was 1946, when a large part
of the demobilization of the economy took place.The two periods of
mobilization, 1939—43 and 1949—51, witnessed almost as large a shift of
capital. But even in years such as 1949, when capital was not increasing,
the differential movements of capital were almost as large as in relatively
prosperous years such as 1944 and 1948.
INSTABILITY OF INVESTMENT
The annual rate of investment is a relatively volatile magnitude even
when it is restricted to durable goods, and the addition of inventories and
other forms of working capital increases the instability. The average of
the annual rates of increase of capital over the period is 8.43 per cent, but
the standard deviation of these rates is 6.57 per cent. This instability is of
course the Great Commonplace of all theories of business fluctuations.
The instability of investment rates is no less marked for individual
industries.It would be possible for aggregate investment to fluctuate
widely and at the same time for the industrial patterns of rate of invest-
ment to be stable: this would happen if the movements of general business
dominated the investment of individual industries.But the industrial
SIn1950, for example, industry assets ranged from $40.6 million in millinery to
$15.8 billion in petroleum refining—a range of 1 to 390.
There is a modest positive rank correlation between 1950 size of industry and 1947—
54 percentage increase of assets, however (p =.23,with 99 industries). In the 1938—47
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pattern is highly unstable (see Table 7); one is tempted to ask, not how
strong the association is between successive annual rates of increase of
capital, but whether there is any association. There is, in fact, a positive
association in all but three years, but the correlations are nonsignificant
in 13 out of 17 cases.
TABLE 7
RANK CORRELATION OF PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN ASSETS AMONG
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, PAIRS 05 YEARS, 1938—57
Period Correlation Coefficient Number of Industries
1938—39 with 1939—40 —.104 82
1939—40 with 1940—41 .311 82
1940—41 with 1941—42 .290 82
1941-42 with 1942-43 .118 82
1942-43 with 1943—44 .254 82
1943—44 with 1944—45 .205 82
1944-45 with 1945—46 .138 82
1945—46 with 1946—47 .025 82
1946—47 with 1947—48 .116 75
1947—48 with 1948—49 .105 99
1948—49 with 1949—50 .067 99
1949—50 with 1950—51 .092 99
1950—51 with 1951_53a .366 99
1951_53a with 1953—54 — .158 99
1953—54 with 1954—55 —.017 99
1954—55 with 1955—56 .011 99
1955—56 with 1956_57b .153 99
a Two-yearchange.
b For 1956—57, percentage increase in corporate assets.
SOURCE: Tables A-14 to A-59.
One large source of variation in the industrial pattern of rates of invest-




any error in the capital data for the intermediate year (t —1)works in
opposite directions on the relative increases. It can be shown in fact that,
even if the correlation between the precisely measured rates of capital
increase were .75, the observed correlation could be as small as .125 if the
variance of the errors in measuring capital in any year were half as large
as the variance of the annual changes in capital.1°
10 Let (C, + 6,) be the logarithm of the observed capital in an industry in year 1,
where C is the "true" figure and â is the error of measurement. The observed correlation
between rates of increase in the two successive years will be:
r0= correlationof (C3 + 6, —C,—6)with (C3 + 6,, —C,—6,).
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This effect of errors of measurement can be reduced by lengthening the
periods over which changes in capital are measured, for then the error
in measurement is unaffected but the true change is increased. Taking a
longer time span, the industrial pattern of rates of increase in capital
becomes more stable.For example, the correlation between rates of
increase in capital from 1949 to 1951 with 1951 to 1953 is .422, whereas
the maximum correlation of successive annual rates in that period was
only .366 (and it was based upon one two-year change)."
The magnitude of the errors in measurement of capital in a given year
relative to the magnitude of annual changes in capital is unknown, but it
is surely substantial and possibly the measurement errors are of the same
order of magnitude as the annual changes in an industry's capital stock.'2
Since we can form no independent estimate of measurement errors, we
deal usually with periods longer than one year in the analysis of rates of
change of capital.
INCREASES IN ASSETS AND COMPANIES
The average assets of manufacturing industries grew by 60.3 per cent from
1948 to 1956, but assets of corporations of average size in each industry
The true correlation if there were no errors would be:
=correlationof (C2 —C,)with (C, —C0).
By definition,
(C3 + —C2—ô2)(C2+ ô2 —C,—
To Xo,+o,_ +o,— o,—a,
Ifthe errors arc not correlated with the C's or with one another,
al,5 + o, —— a, =— , +a, —
= crl,+ 2a, say.
Substituting in the definition,




Using the definition of r0,
Tori10—
= al, + 2a
—r,—A
11The correlation coefficient between relative changes in assets from 1947 to 1950 with
those from 1950 to 1954 was .361.
12 On the other hand, an error is likely to be correlated with the change in capital,
and errors in successive years are surely also correlated, so the formula in footnote 10 is































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.AND THE PATTERN OF RATES OF RETURN
increased 65.3 per cent, showing the average number of corporations to
have declined slightly.'3 Of course one expects average company size to
rise (in current dollars of assets) in a period of rising prices, but deflated
assets rose by more than one-third over this eight-year period.
TABLE 9
























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I (slowest) 9 —.03344 .01807 — 1.1
II 10 .07675 .15753 205.3 3.4
III 10 .10576 .13360 126.3 5.3
IV 10 .14472 .16414 113.4 1.1
V 10 .18458 .15854 85.9 1.0
VI 10 .21842 .17769 81.4 8.3
VII 10 .25653 .24912 97.1 10.6
VIII 10 .29841 .22542 75.5 12.3
IX 10 .32661 .26364 80.7 8.2
X (fastest) 10 .44697 .28846 64.5 4.2
All manufacturing
industries 99 .20491 .21853 106.6 5.6
SOURCE: Same as for Table 8.
The stability in the total number of corporate tax returns during a
period of rapid growth of manufactures occurred because industries ni
which most corporations are found (food, textiles, and apparel) grew
much less rapidly than the remainder of manufacturing industries did.
The near-zero value of the (unweighted) average percentage change in
the number of firms per industry, on the other hand, indicates that the
phenomenon of stability in numbers was widespread. In fact, 48 of the 99
industries had a decline in the number of corporations.
The largest decreases in number of corporations occurred in a declining
industry (broad-woven wool) and others which grew substantially (tin
cans, cereals, engines and turbines, etc.), as Table 8 shows.But the
industries with large increases in firms were those having unusually rapid
3Theyear 1948 is chosen as base because the 1947 number of tax returns cannot be
estimated reliably on a basis comparable with the later years. These are unweighted
averages of the industries, The number of returns in all manufacturing industries rose
4.6 per cent over the period.
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growth—a relationship that was quite general. We may partition the




whereA is industry corporate assets, S is average assets per corporation,
and X is number of corporations, and the subscripts refer to dates. Then
the share of industry increase (log A2/A1) that is "accounted for" by
increase of firm sizes (log S2/S1) can be tabulated by deciles, as in Table 9.
The more rapidly an industry grew, the smaller the share accounted for
by increased firm size and the larger the share accounted for by increased
number of corporations. This is of course an eminently reasonable finding:
that firms tend to leave slowly growing industries (often declining indus-
tries) and enter the most rapidly growing industries.Moreover, the
rapidly growing industries had, on balance, larger average corporations
(measured by assets in 1956) than the slowly growing industries had, but
the relationship was very loose.
2. Rates of Return
The average rate of return on total assets was 7.2 per cent for the period
1938—56 (Table l0).14 Aside from the only severe depression year, 1938,
the average rate fluctuated between 5.4 and 10.4 per cent (after taxes),
and averaged 7.5 per cent excluding that initial year. The rate of return
when both income and asset data are converted to 1947 prices averaged
7.2 per cent, identical with the average of book-value rates. But if the
process of deflation had no effect upon the average rate over the nineteen-
year period, it had a noticeable influence upon its trend. The deflated
rate fell below the book-value rate from 1939 to 1949, with peak differences
in 1943 and 1947; from 1950 to 1957 the deflated rate exceeded the
book-value rate by a steadily increasing amount. The effect of the
adjustment for price changes is much smaller than its effect on capital,
since a roughly parallel deflation of income is also made. The adjustment
for accelerated depreciation (discussed in Appendix A) may have had as
large an effect as that for inflation: calculations under admittedly extreme
assumptions suggest that, in the absence of such depreciation, the rate of
return would have been appreciably higher from 1942 through 1945, then
lower through 1951, and higher again after 1951.
14Therates of return are calculated as total capital returns (excluding dividends
received from other corporations) as a percentage of total assets (excluding investments
in other companies) and therefore differ from the rates of return on stockholder's equity
or net worth.
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TABLE 10
PERCENTAGE RATE OF RETURN IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 1939—57
Average Rate Average Rate























Comparable to subsequent years.
NOTE: Calculations are based upon two-digit industries.For a description of the
computations, see Appendix A, p. 118.
The rate of return on capital, unlike the annual relative changes in the
stock of capital, has been comparatively insensitive to business conditions.
In our period there were four peak years (1944, 1948, 1953, and 1957) and
four trough years (1938, 1946, 1949, and 1954), and in the peak years the
rate of return averaged 7.34 per cent (see Table 10), whereas in the trough
years it averaged 6.09 per cent.'6 The average rose more than a negligible
amount in six of fifteen years of expansion, and fell in three of four years
of contraction, so conformity to business conditions was closer in business
declines.One gets the impression that changes in corporate income
taxation were as important as business fluctuations in explaining fluctua-
tions in rates of return.
The movements of the rate of return broadly paralleled those of the
rate of investment. In both series the peak was reached in the immediate
postwar period (1946—47), with lesser peaks coming early in World War II
(1941) and the Korean War (1950). The rank correlation between annual 'Indeed,excluding 1938, the prewar trough, the latter average is 7.25 per cent.
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rates of investment and the current annual rates of return in all manu-
factures was .67 for the eighteen-year period 1939 to 1956.'°
What use was made of higher rates of return to obtain the vast expansion
of the munitions industries during the war? The facts are given in the
tabulation below.
Average Rate of Return (per cent)







aShips,aircraft, firearms, ammunition, tanks, sighting and firing equipment, munitions,
n.e.c.
Among the many limitations of our data, one is especially important at
this point:the rates of return are calculated upon end-of-year assets
rather than average (or possibly mid-year) assets. When the rate of
growth of assets was very high—and in the munitions industries it was
reported as 356 per cent in 1942—the rate of return is seriously under-
estimated. The previous year-end assets are not strictly comparable to
the current year-end assets because of the shifting of companies but, taking
the data at face value, the rates of return may be recalculated on a mid-
year asset basis. On the assumption that the increase of assets was linear,
the adjusted rates of return will be as shown below.'7
Rate of Return in Munitions







The effects of the adjustment are very marked: the rate of return is much
higher in the earlier years, and somewhat lower in 1944 and 1945.If
There is little evidence, in these aggregative data, of any relationship between the
rate of investment and the profit rate of the preceding year (p =.33for 1939 to 1954).
'7Thatis, let A0 and A1 be assets at the beginning and end of year respectively, and R
income. Then we can calculate R/(A0 + A1). A constant geometric rate of increase
of assets would perhaps be more plausible.
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proper allowance could be made for accelerated depreciation, the rate
would be appreciably higher in the two latter years. Our data therefore
do not deny that extensive use was made of profit incentives in the
mobilization of resources during the war.
DISPERSION OF RATES OF RETURN
The unweighted average rate of return of individual industries followed
a course closely similar to that of all manufacturing, but was generally
higher during the war period and lower in the postwar period (Table 1 l).'8
TABLE 11














1938 82 2.72 3.31 0.50 4.25
1939 82 6.21 3.16 4.11 7.69
1940 82 6.80 2.96 4.75 8.21
1941 82
82
8.49 2.37 6.86 9.85
1942 7.56 1.91 6.13 8.68
1943 82 7.40 2.02 6.19 8.56
1944 82 6.95 1.97 5.73 8.18
1945 82 6.18 1.99 5.03 7.50
1946 82 10.29 4.31 7.38 13.25
1947 82 10.93 3.01 8.92 12.68
1947 99 10.29 4.26 8.15 12.54
1948 99 9.40 3.22 6.97 11.89
1949 99 6.93 3.01 4.97 8.69
1950 99 9.07 2.58 7.44 10.81
1951 99 6.37 2.43 5.19 8.23
1953 99 5.16 2.12 4.05 6.61
1954 99 4.86 2.33 3.41 6.45
1955 99 6.34 2.40 4.85 8.81
1956 99 6.17 2.18 4.67 7.75
1957 99 5.41 2.49 379 6.94
NOTE: Calculations are based ott three-digit industries.The average, unlike that of
Table 10, excludes certain industries (munitions, and industries that could not be adjusted
for reclassification of large companies) -
SOURCE:Tables A-l4 to A.59.
Aside from the initial depression year the rates never averaged below 4.9
per cent, and in all but five years fell between 6 and 10 per cent.
But the dispersion of industry rates was very great; the annual distri-
butions are displayed in the panels of Chart 3. The dispersion was least
in 1942—45, under the impact of very heavy corporate taxes but, these
18 The averages are restricted to the "basic" set of industries, excluding munitions
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years aside, the standard deviation always exceeded 2 per cent. The
empirical significance of the famous theorem that the rates of return tend
to equality under competition, and the relevance of our data to this
theorem, are discussed in detail in the next chapter.
These dispersions refer, of course, to interindustry differences in rates of
return, and each industry average represents the weighted average of the
firms' rates of return, ranging from 30 (cereals) to 6,989 (women's apparel)
individual returns in 1950. For another purpose, described in Chapter 3,
estimates were made of the dispersion of rates of return among firms
within an industry,19 and they are much larger. The standard deviations
(calculated from 22 two-digit industry classes) in 1954, for example, are





0—50 18.6 37.0 23.4
50—100 11.4 48.4 15.8
100—250 10.2 20.2 14.4
250—500 8.6 22.1 12.0
500—1,000 7.8 17.9 12.3
1,000—5,000 7.5 18.7 11.4
5,000—10,000 6.1 16.3 10.0
10,000—50,000 6.6 14.2 9.3
Similar estimates for other years consistently shared both characteristics
of these standard deviations: the absolute level was high, and it fell quite
steadily as the size of the enterprise increased.
THE INDUSTRIAL PATTERN OF RATES OF RETURN
The industrial pattern of annual rates of increase of capital was found to
be unstable over time, in considerable (and perhaps dominant) part
because of measurement errors. The industrial pattern of rates of return,
on the contrary, is relatively stable from year to year (Table 12): in every
pair of years the correlation coefficient is highly significant. Aside from
the years of demobilization after World War II, the coefficients are, in
fact, always above .6 and average more than •720 In the next chapter 'SeeChapter 3, footnote 14.
20Thestatistical sources of instability that obscure the pattern of investment rates have
much less influence upon the rates of return. A reclassification of companies, for example,
will have at most a minor effect on an industry's rate of return because income is re-
classified with assets.
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TABLE 12
CORRELATION BETWEEN RATES OF RETURN IN MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES IN SUCCESSIVE YEARS, 1938—57
Pair of Years Number of IndustriesCorrelation Coefficient
1938 and 1939 82 .769
1939 and 1940 82 .848
1940 and 1941 82 .803
1941 and 1942 82 .782
1942 and 1943 82 .730
1943 and 1944 82 .885
1944 and 1945 82 .776
1945 and 1946 82 .494
1946 and 1947 82 .468
1947 and 1948 99 .689
1948 and 1949 99 .626
1949 and1950 99 .677
1950 and 1951 99 .775
1951 and 1953 99 .738
1953 and1954 99 .828
1954 and1955 99 .826
1955 and 1956 99 .808
1956 and 1957 99 .790
the stability of the industry pattern over longer periods of time is
explored.
The pattern is in general more stable—the correlation coefficients are
larger—the less the dispersion of rates of return (see Table 11). During
the war years, the dispersion of rates fell to a very low level due to heavy
taxation, and the correlations of successive years were high; conversely
in 1945—47, the dispersion of rates reached a peak and the correlations a
trough. There is apparently a strong tendency toward at least short-run
persistence of interindustry differentials in rates of return, and only very
heavy impacts on this structure, arising out of major and sudden shifts of
resources, are able to weaken this tendency appreciably., The implications
of this characteristic for investment behavior are discussed in Chapter 4.
3. Investment and Returns in Book Values Versus Stable Prices
Throughout this chapter we have quietly assumed that changes in asset
value were to be interpreted as changes in the volume of capital resources
disposed of by an industry. Yet the period was one of inflation—and of
substantial magnitude—upon which were superimposed highly diverse
movements of individual prices. How can we know whether the industrial
pattern of movement of book values of assets reflects movement of resources
rather than of asset prices?
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In order to give at least a partial answer to this question, deflated
capital values have been calculated for the major industrial categories in
each year. 21Although corresponding price deflators for three-digit
industries require assumptions that seem seriously unreasonable, the
comparative behavior of "real" and book-value assets for the broader
groups sheds considerable light on the effects of price movements.
A direct comparison of annual percentage increases in book-value and
"real" assets yields very favorable results on the whole (Table 13).In
TABLE 13
CORRELATION OF PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN ASSETS, IN BOOK VALUES
AND 1947 PRICES, MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 1938—57
Coefficient of


























NOTE: Based upon 20 two-digit industries through 1947, and 22 two-digit irsduStries
thereafter.
aForpercentage changes in corporate assets only.
15 of 19 annual comparisons, the rank correlation exceeds .9 and in no
year does it fall below .8.Moreover, if we compare movements over
three-year periods, the correlations are all above .94.The deflation
1SeeAppendix A.
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leaves the ranking of industrial categories by rates of increase of assets
almost unchanged.
There is good reason to believe that a similar result would hold for
minor industries if we could deflate the assets data. If we denote assets by
A, and price indexes by P, the relative increase in book values from year 1
to year 2 is A2/A1, whereas the deflated relative increase is
A2 /A1—A2/P1
P1 —A1/p2
If we let a =logA2/A1
b =logP2/P1
then we wish to know the correlation between a and (a + b). Let a' and




— Xaa(c+ c7 + 2Yao,rab)''2
aa + CbTab
— (a+ cr + 2aaybrab)'12
If Tabissmall—if the movements of book values and price deflators are not
closely correlated—
Ta(a4.b)= approximately, (l+)
that is, increases in book values will be closely correlated with movements
in deflated values, providing the standard deviation of the rates of price
increase among industries is much smaller than the standard deviation of
the rates of increase of assets in book values, and the two are not highly
correlated. These conditions appear to hold.
The correlations between percentage change in book-value assets and
percentage change in price deflators are usually fairly small for the two-
digit industrial groups; and they are possibly smaller among the three-
digit industries.22 The variance of the percentage increases in capital is
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many times the variance of the price ratios for the two-digit groups.23 We
know the variance of the percentage rates of increase in the assets of minor
industries is much larger than that of the major industrial groups. The
price deflators are in good part (i.e., with respect to durable assets and
working capital) based upon prices common to many industries, and in
general one does not expect fairly broad price indexes appropriate to the
deflation of assets of industries to display the diversity that rates of
investment show.
TABLE 14
COMPARISON OF RATE OF RETURN, IN BOOK VALVES AND 1947 PRICES,
TWO-DIGIT INDUSTRIES, SELECTED YEARS, 1938—56
Average Absolute
Unweightea' Average Deviation Between
Rate of Return Coefficient ofBook-Value Rate
Tear Book Values 1947 Prices
(per cent)
Rank Correlationand 1947 Rate
(per cent)
1938 2.87 2.88 .998 .20
1947 9.94 9.51 .968 .60
1954 5.50 6.04 .955 .53
1956 6.51 7.38 .963 .87
SOURCE:Tables A-14 to A-59.
These arguments apply much more weakly to comparisons of relative
increases of assets at different times. A rise in book values of 1 per cent in
1933 would represent a larger increase in assets than a rise of 10 per cent
in 1947 would (when the average price index rose 10.8 per cent). In our
period, however, the movements of asset prices were sufficiently steady,
so the general order of magnitude of the rates of increase of book values is
fairly similar to those for deflated values; the rank coefficient of correlation
for the two series in Table 3 is .895 for the period 1938—54.
The rates of return have been calculated in 1947 prices as well as in
book values.24 The agreement between the two, at the level of the major
The derivative of ra(a+b) with respect to (r,,) has the sign of
—r,2.







In addition, rates of return were calculated in current prices (see Appendix A).
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industrial groups, is in general very close (see the rank correlations in
Table 14). The absolute levels of the two series are also fairly close, since
we deflate income as well as assets:the absolute difference in rates in
1947 prices and book values averaged .38 percentage points during the
period 1938—57.
53